This paper shows how a number of questions about dominant strategy mechanisms in models with public goods can be conveniently formulated as systems of partial differential equations. The question of the existence of dominant strategy mechanisms with such desirable properties becomes equivalent to the integrability of these equations. 3 In addition to enabling us to derive rapidly and-strengthen a variety of known results on incentives, our approach permits us to develop certain new theorems and to provide an insight into the common mathematical structure of several apparently different questions.
In Section 2, we establish notation and in the following section substantially strengthen the Green-Laffont [5] characterization theorem. Section 4 contains a condition on the class of utility functions which is necessary and sufficient for the existence of balanced incentive compatible mechanisms. This condition is used to prove an impossibility theorem for two-agent models and some possibility and impossibility results for models with more than two agents. Finally in Section 5 we consider coalition incentive compatibility. Our results are essentially negative, centering around a general necessary condition for the existence of mechanisms which are incentive compatible for a class of coalitions.
THE MODEL
We consider an economy with n (n -2) consumers (indexed by i = 1, . . . , n) and two commodities, one public and one private.
The utility function of consumer i, ui(K, xi), is additively separable between the public good K and the private good xi, i = 1, . . . , n, and without loss of generality we write it as: ui (K, xi) = vi (K, Oi) + xi where As, lying in a space Oi, is a parameter of the valuation functions and where for simplicity we assume that the quantity K of public good ranges in the set
The decision maker is supposed to know the functions vi(,) (possibly identical for all consumers) but is ignorant of the true value 6i of the parameter 6i which identifies agent i's tastes for the public good. The purpose of a mechanism is to choose an optimal level of the public good in this framework of imperfect information. More formally, a mechanism is a mapping, f( ), from the "strategy spaces"5 0= [in 1 Oi into R+ xR n composed of a decision function, d( ) from 0 into R+, and of an n-tuple of transfer functions t( ) = [t1(* ),... , tn( 4)] from 69 into R. d ( * ) associates to any n-tuple 0 of announced parameters a quantity d (0) of public good, while ti(6) is a transfer of the private good to agent i, i = 1, . . . , n. The mechanism is said to be continuously differentiable or C1 when the function f( ) is continuously differentiable.
Since the endowments of the private good play no role in the paper we will write the utility function of an agent i faced with a mechanism (d(), t()) as: The second principal merit of the approach taken here is its constructive character, which, given an admissible family of valuation functions, enables us to construct the transfer functions explicitly. This feature is particularly useful in the sections to follow where additional constraints such as balance or coalition incentive compatibility9 are imposed on the mechanisms.
To illustrate this constructive character, let us consider the quadratic case and obtain the associated transfer functions. We have It is then merely a matter of calculation to check that this expression differs from by a function of 0-i. One might believe that the smaller the admissible set, the stronger the characterization theorem; when agents have less opportunity for misrepresenting their preferences, there are ostensibly fewer constraints on potential mechanisms. As a referee pointed out to us, however, this intuitive argument is incorrect in general because as the admissible set shrinks, the set of possible mechanisms itself shrinks. Indeed, it is possible (as the referee has shown) to give examples of domains V1 and V2, with V2 a proper subset of V1, such that there exist successful, nonGroves mechanisms for V2 but not for V1. Of course, as Theorem 3.1 demonstrates, such examples are impossible if V2 consists of differentiable functions indexed by a parameter whose domain is an interval. Independent of our work, Holmstrom [8] established the more general result that every successful mechanism on a smoothly connected admissible set is in the Groves class. Therefore, his theorem generalizes Theorem 3.1, although his proof is nonconstructive.
BALANCED MECHANISMS
A well known deficiency of Groves mechanisms is the fact that they are not in general balanced; that is the sum of the prescribed transfers, X,=1ti(0), is not identically zero10 over the range of parameters 0 e 9.
By restricting the space of admissible functions one might hope to be able to obtain balance through an appropriate choice of the arbitrary functions hi(*) in the Groves mechanisms. Indeed, Groves and Loeb [7] have shown that, for n ? 3, there exists a balanced satisfactory mechanism for the quadratic family, VQ= {01K -(K2/2), . . ., 0nK -(K2/2), 0 e 9}. 
COALITION INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY
The lack of robustness of Groves mechanisms with respect to manipulations by coalitions is a well known fact. Green and Laffont [4] prove that, in the case of a {0, 1} project space, no coalition incentive compatible dominant strategy mechanism exists even if one restricts allowable coalitions14 to a single coalition of any size, when no restriction is imposed on preferences.
In this section we give a similar impossibility result for differentiable satisfactory mechanisms and then give a necessary condition for coalition incentive compatibility for a restricted class of coalitions. It is clear from the above argument that we do not need all coalitions to obtain nonexistence. In fact, the proof requires only one coalition of size two. The last question we turn to is then, whether we can characterize the classes of coalitions which admit s.c.i.c. mechanisms.
We shall establish a simple general result of which our impossibility theorem, using coalitions of size two, is a special case.
To do this, we must first define what we shall call the differential incidence matrix ao1' ao1' a0l' aol' ao2' a82' ao2' o2' aO32 aO3' a93' aO3' ao4' ao4 ao4 ao4
Observe that, in our proof of the nonexistence of a satisfactory mechanism which is s.c.i.c. for a class 'C containing a coalition of cardinality two, the key to the argument was the demonstration that, for some i # j, at_ avi ad(0) a,j aK aoj
This idea is the basis of the following theorem which provides a necessary condition for coalitional incentive compatibility.16
